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U.S.—LIBYA RELATIONS: A NEW ERA?

Thursday, July 22, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (Chairman of the Subcommittee) Presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will come to order.

Today, the Subcommittee will examine U.S. relations with Libya and Libya's growing role on the African continent. Over the last several months, the regime of Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi, which has lasted for 30 years has been on a diplomatic offensive. Having turned over two suspects in the Pan Am 103 case, Libya has managed to have the United Nations sanctions against it suspended. Libya has also undertaken numerous diplomatic initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa.

It is noteworthy that this upcoming September, the Organization of African Unity will hold an extraordinary session in Tripoli. Until recently Libya had been a long-time OAU nonparticipant. Libya is clearly moving away from its diplomatic isolation.

America's rocky relationship with Qadhafi's Libya goes back two decades. In the 1970's commercial relations between the two countries were considerable, with United States-Libya trade at that time totaling more than $4 billion annually. During these years, many Libyan students studied in the United States. This ended when the U.S. broke diplomatic ties with Libya in 1981 due to its sponsorship of international terrorism. Our 1986 bombing of Tripoli in retaliation for Libya's bombing of the Berlin disco, which took the lives of American servicemen, was soon followed by the imposition of comprehensive U.S. travel and trade bans, which have been renewed annually.

The bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie led to U.N. sanctions being imposed on Libya in 1992. The recent suspension of U.N. sanctions on Libya, done with U.S. approval, has opened the door for Libya to reestablish international air links to upgrade its oil industry and develop its infrastructure with the aid of foreign investment. The U.S. recently ended its ban on Libyan commercial purchases of American food and medicine.

The Subcommittee is looking forward to hearing how the administration will proceed with Libya policy as the Lockerbie trial proceeds. While Libya's cooperation with this trial will be a good ba-
rometer of its future intentions toward the U.S. other nations, the U.S. has other issues of concern with Libya including its development of weapons of mass destruction and any current support for terrorism.

An area of particular concern to this Subcommittee is Libya's role in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the years, Libya has provided military aid to numerous rebel groups, including the RUF, the Revolutionary United Front, in Sierra Leone which recently managed to terrorize its way into the government. Libya has also emerged as a diplomatic player, injecting itself into Sudan, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict. Sometimes it has done this in the guise of peacemaker; and sometimes it has done it as an arms supplier.

It is hard to look at Libya's involvement in these conflicts, in many cases, as a plus. It is also hard not to see Libya's increasing presence in Africa as a challenge to U.S. diplomacy on the continent. Qadhafi's intention to have Libya assume a leading role in Africa should be of concern. It is clear that Libya's international profile is changing. What is less clear is whether this change is fundamental and whether this change is an improvement.

Libya has the potential to significantly impact U.S. political, economic and security interests. Today's hearing should shed light on how we should proceed with Libya to advance our National interests. I would now like to recognize Mr. Payne, who is the ranking Member on this Subcommittee, for his opening statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this very important and timely hearing on Libya. As you have indicated, there has been many changes that recently have been going on. I think it is probably too early to judge where we are with Libya-U.S. relations.

At the height of the Cold War, Libya rejected the Soviet Union as the leader of the Eastern Bloc and the United States as the Western Bloc because in their eyes they were all colonial powers. Libya followed Egypt's Nasser's lead and had to rely on the non-aligned movement. However, by the mid-1970's, Libya turned to the Soviet Union for weapons denied by the West and because the Soviets were more supportive of the Arab cause against our ally, Israel.

Since that time, Libya has been a country, in my opinion, specially currently confused with its place in the international community. Although geographically located on the continent of Africa, Libya is seen primarily as an Arab nation, as are all of the North African countries. However, during the last year, in defiance of the U.N. Air embargo, many African leaders have traveled to Tripoli.

Since the OAU meeting last week and the handover of two Libyans accused of carrying out the bombing of Pan Am 103, many African leaders, including President Isayas of Eritrea, Chairman of the Sierra Leone peace talks; President Eyadema of Togo; President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, immediate past president; and President Museveni of Uganda and President Taylor of Liberia, have all stated their desire for Qadhafi to become involved and sometimes mediate conflicts in the region. He has actually also offered his mediation for the India-Pakistan conflict in addition to a number of those in Africa.
In conclusion, let me say that I am anxious to hear the testimony of the witnesses before us and hope we can shed some light on this newly unfolding relationship between Arab-African nations and the United States.

Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

Ambassador Ronald Neumann was appointed to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in September 1997. Prior to this appointment, he served as Ambassador to Algeria. Ambassador Neumann has extensive experience in the Near East, having also served in Iran, Yemen and elsewhere; and he testified before our Subcommittee in the last Congress on Algeria and the Western Sahara. It is good to see you back, Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EAST AFFAIR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. NEUMANN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Payne, and thank you for inviting me to speak to you on the current status of U.S.-Libya policy, an area where patience and our diplomatic initiatives have brought a significant success. It has been some time since hearings have been held on this subject, so if you will permit me, I will begin with just a brief reflection of how we got where we are.

It is important to remember that approximately 18 months ago, U.N. sanctions, in place since 1992, were having an impact on Libya, but the symbolic dimensions, the ban on air travel and mandate to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence, were seen as increasingly futile. International support for new pressure on Libya was declining. Sanctions fatigue was setting in. Others in the region and our own allies believed it important for all concerned to try to bring the matter to a close, but Libya was coming no closer to surrendering the suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing.

Against this backdrop, Secretary Albright met with the families of the Pan Am 103 victims in August 1997. She listened carefully to them, was moved by their pain, and she promised to do something to provide the victims and families with some measure of justice and closure as the tenth anniversary of the tragedy approached.

We began months of discussion with the British and the Dutch. Our goal was to fulfill the U.N. Security Council's mandated requirement of a U.K. or U.S. trial for the two indicted Libyans. We and the British had insisted since the 1988 bombing and the 1991 indictment that the suspects could be tried only in a U.S. or U.K. Court. Colonel Qadhafi had suggested he would accept a Scottish trial in a third country, and we decided to call his bluff.

We established a Scottish court, applying Scottish law and providing Scottish legal safeguards in the Netherlands. This was no easy feat. It required new legislation to be passed by the Dutch parliament, an Order in Council to be adopted by the British Government, a U.K.-Netherlands agreement and the strong support of these two allies.

On August 24 of last year, we unveiled our plan and said to Libya, you have repeatedly expressed support for a third-country
trial venue. As Secretary Albright said, take it or leave it. We expect you now, we said to the Libyans, to surrender the two suspects for trial before a Scottish court seated in the Netherlands. We and the U.K. Presented our initiative to the U.N. Security Council, and members endorsed it unanimously.

Secretary Albright met again with the Pan Am 103 families on October 26 to explain the initiative. Most of the families supported our efforts, including most of those who had originally been reluctant. Secretary Albright committed that there would be no negotiations and that she would seek tougher sanctions if Libya did not surrender the suspects. We refused to negotiate. There was no secret deal.

Instead, from August to April, we worked through U.N. Secretary-General Annan to provide clarifications, primarily of legal aspects, of our initiative. We assured the Libyans that, once surrendered, the suspects would be tried fairly and in strict accordance with Scottish law. We provided no guarantees of where the evidence would lead or how the trial would be conducted. The trial would be a genuine criminal proceeding, not a political show trial.

On April 5, Libya surrendered the suspects, thanks in large part to the efforts of Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi Arabian ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, South African President Mandela, Egyptian President Mubarak and U.N. Secretary-General Annan. But our clear determination to see the suspects surrendered for trial in a Scottish court was of critical importance.

Upon surrender of the suspects, U.N. sanctions were suspended in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1192. I would stress that U.S. unilateral sanctions remain in place. Resolution 1192 also asked the Secretary-General to report to Council members within 90 days on Libyan compliance with the remaining Security Council requirements. These requirements, outlined in three resolutions, demand that Libya renounce and end all support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions of its officials, cooperate with the trial and pay appropriate compensation. We continue to require that they those conditions be fully fulfilled.

We met twice in New York, first with the U.N. Secretary General and the British; and then with the Secretary General, the British and the Libyans. We invited the Libyans to attend this meeting in order to make clear to them what the resolutions require, that we are serious about full compliance and that such compliance is not impossible. We also made clear our view that we would not agree to terminate U.N. sanctions until compliance had been demonstrated by Libyan actions.

As a practical matter, we will not be able to assure ourselves that Libya is cooperating fully with the trial until after it is substantially under way.

On June 30, 1999, the Secretary General reported to the Council that Libya had made assurances it would fulfill all the requirements, but had not yet done so. The Council responded with a Council Presidential statement that welcomed the positive signs from Libya, but confirmed that Libya had not complied fully, and that sanctions would not be lifted until Libya did. The Council ex-
pressed its gratitude to the Secretary General for his efforts and requested he follow Libyan developments and report accordingly. In other words, instead of acceding to calls by some for an immediate lifting of sanctions, the world community is now clearly on record as agreeing that additional requirements remain and that they must be fulfilled.

The Council’s unanimous position was heavily influenced by U.S. diplomatic efforts. We were forthright about our intention to veto any resolution that would have tried prematurely to lift sanctions. However, much of the world has been quick to welcome Libya back into the community of nations. On the political front, a number of nations have reestablished diplomatic relations, and Libya has become much more active in regional organizations, as you noted, sir.

On the economic front, immediately following the suspension of U.N. sanctions proscribing direct air traffic to and from Libya, foreign airlines opened direct routes to Tripoli. Foreign firms have also welcomed Libya’s indications of interest in large infrastructure projects, including in the petroleum sector and aircraft purchases. We have taken a different route, emphasizing the need for Libya to take positive actions to end its support for terrorism and meet all the requirements of the U.N. Security Council resolutions before unilateral or multilateral sanctions can be lifted.

We acknowledge Libya’s recent declarations of its intention to turn over a new page, but given its history, such statements are not enough. Positive actions are essential if Libya is to be re-integrated into the international community, beginning with full cooperation in the Pan Am 103 trial and full compliance with the remaining U.N. Security Council requirements.

We recognize that Libya has publicly declared its intention to play an active, constructive role in regional conflicts. It will be important to test that this rhetoric is supported by constructive and consistent actions. There are several problem areas where Libya can demonstrate a changed attitude through helpful, concrete action.

We expect Libya to fulfill all of its U.N. Security Council requirements: renounce and end all support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions of its officials, cooperate with the trial, and pay appropriate compensation. Only when Libya has complied fully will we be able to consider lifting U.S. sanctions against Libya. Right now, such steps would be premature.

At the same time, it is important to make clear that we have no hidden agenda. We have set for Libya clear, specific benchmarks that it must meet if it is to become a responsible and constructive member of the international community. We have set goals Libya can meet if it has the will to do so.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Neumann appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I will ask you a couple of questions.

First, we had a situation last month where the interior ministers from eight Mediterranean countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, pledged jointly to cooperate in fighting terrorism. Libya was
accepted by the others into this group. How do our allies in the Mediterranean view Libya, specifically its commitment to fight terrorism?

Mr. NEUMANN. Sir, when you say the Mediterranean, you are talking about both sides there, North African neighbors and the southern Mediterranean European states?

Mr. ROYCE. Correct.

Mr. NEUMANN. There is a limit to how much a foreign diplomat should speak for others, but I should say everybody I know in the region is approaching Libya with some measure of caution. Libya has a very long, disruptive record, and that is not just in its relations with us, but its relations with its neighbors. But I would say that its neighbors all hope that Libya is turning a new page.

Now, each one proceeds in its own way, but I would say that there is a general mix of hope and caution in all of those states. The mix of that is different from state to state, but I think with the Europeans—for instance, Libya was allowed to participate for the first time in a Barcelona meeting, but with a sort of particular status as an invited guest that kept them short of being a full member and speaking; and I think that illustrates both sides of the caution and the hope with which the Europeans are pursuing relations with Libya.

Mr. ROYCE. You would assume that this level of engagement is significant, I would assume from the fact that eight nations invited Libya to be part of that process?

Mr. NEUMANN. I think it has certainly encouraged Libya, but I think the real questions lie in the future on both sides; that is, one, will European states proceed to give Libya the benefit of the doubt, if you will, moving forward on a variety of cooperations without any evidence of a changed behavior? Or will they proceed, as we are urging them to, with a bit more caution and care?

The other side is the reciprocal, will Libya try to pocket what are symbolic, but frankly rather slender gains, and go right back to its old ways; or will the Libyans recognize that the way to a better future with the international community is to continue to change their behavior? That is really the most important question and the one which none of us, including myself, can answer yet.

Mr. ROYCE. There is no doubt what leads these eight European Mediterranean powers to engagement.

Mr. NEUMANN. That is certainly what they tell us.

Mr. ROYCE. How will the 1996 Iran and Libyan Sanctions Act work if other countries, now in active negotiations with the Libyan Government over oil and gas concessions, make such investments? Do we foresee political conflict with our allies over this long period Ambassador?

Mr. NEUMANN. I would say that we always foresee problems and try to avoid them, but the fact of the matter is the Libyan, the Iranian-Libyan Sanctions Act is still on the books. It is still law. We are watching very carefully. So far the things we have seen that we have been able to investigate have been either based on contracts that were signed before ILSA came into being, and therefore do not fall under the act, or they have fallen under the threshold. But this is a factual question which simply has to be tested against each new case as it comes up.
So far, most of these things are either press stories or in discussion stages. It has been a very short period of time for things to actually get signed and things to happen on the ground. The particular pipeline contract, for instance, that has been in the press recently was actually signed before sanctions were levied and has been there a very long time. So there is now a flurry of activity, and whether or not it leads to something actually happening and whether that activity would fall under the act are both questions that just have to be factually determined.

Mr. Royce. I know you touched on this in your testimony, but could you recap under precisely what conditions would the U.S. normalize relations with Libya?

Mr. Neumann. We have come at that question from a particular perspective, which is simply that of what is the behavior we want Libya—what is the behavior we want to see here? We have not addressed in our internal deliberations at what point would one have relations, because that is a by-product of change, and it is not the function of the actions.

What we are trying to convey to Libya in our discussions with its various neighbors, what we made clear in the discussions in New York that Libya attended, is that we have a very clear, very hard set of terms that require real proof of real change in Libyan behavior, but at the same time there is no hidden agenda. There is no trap. It is in Libya's interests in terms of its own reintegration into the world, the international community, to meet those terms; and that is about as far as I can take you because I think the future has to be really a reciprocal of what the Libyans do and how they respond to it, and we will be proceeding based a great deal on that.

The biggest issues in front of us are the ones we keep talking about now. The Libyans need to pay compensation and need to cooperate with the trial, they need to accept the responsibility of their officials and they need to renounce terrorism. But when we say “renounce,” we have a whole series of things we have talked to them about at the United Nations, what actions will demonstrate that.

Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador. My time has expired. We have been joined by Mr. Meeks of New York, Ms. Lee of California, and Mr. Payne of New Jersey, our ranking member. We will now go to Mr. Payne’s questions.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. I understand that sanctions in April on food and medicine sales to Libya has been the intention to remove them. Has that happened yet or what process would that take?

Mr. Neumann. Where we are, first of all, is there was a generic or global decision to change, at the administration's approach, sanctions on food and medicine. It was not a Libyan decision or one directed toward Libya or Libya-specific in any way. Libya, as do all the rest of the countries where sanctions apply, has benefited from that.

I can tell you that it involves a whole bunch of different kinds of things. I don’t think all of the directives are in place yet, because there is a fairly complicated administrative process that has to be set up. I think that is still fine. Details of that are still being
worked out with Treasury, and I just want to do a factual check with my desk officer, who really knows those things.

That process is moving forward. This is to implement a policy decision we made, but it is fairly complex to make sure you do exactly what you want, not something you don’t want.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. I understand it was sort of global, and I guess it includes North Korea and Cuba and Iran and Sudan and the rest. My concern, and I looked at the points that you raised as related to what Libya must do in order for it to even be considered as moving back into our view of a nation; that is, trying to come back into the community of nations that want to renounce and end all support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions of its officials, cooperate with the trial and pay appropriate compensation.

Have the Libyans—has there been any acknowledgment on their part that any of these three conditions would be opposed, or have there been discussions about the conditions? What has been their response, if any?

Mr. NEUMANN. The Libyans in a variety of forums in New York and in discussions with lots of different countries and in their public statements have basically said that they will meet all these conditions. There was a letter which they had turned over to the Secretary General in which they pledged compensation if the people are found guilty. They have said repeatedly that they will renounce terrorism. They have pledged cooperation at the trial.

I think the focal point, the biggest piece of each of these issues is that we want to see these statements demonstrated in their actions. There is nothing in their statements which repudiates these requirements, quite the opposite; but Libya has a very long record of its statements and its actions not quite matching each other, and we think it is very appropriate to see that the actions match up to the statements; and we hope they will.

Mr. PAYNE. I know that there is probably objection or maybe suspicion, but I am sure that there will be people in the State that feel that we should certainly not move forward, but in your opinion, if these conditions are met and if Libya begins to move into compliance, do you think there will still be objections to trying to move toward a more normal relationship with Libya by the U.S. official policy?

Mr. NEUMANN. There are a lot of questions here, and of course, we haven’t even touched on some of the other issues, like weapons of mass destruction, in general how Libya will conduct its relations in Africa and in the Middle East.

You had referred, in your statement, to the questions of stability and stabilization. So I think that anytime you deal with what you do next, there are going to be some different attitudes among people based on where Libya is or perceived to be on all these issues; but I think at the end of the day there is a pretty general agreement that these standards are here for a reason, that we really would like Libya out of the terrorist business, and it is in our interest to see that happen. It is in our interest to see Libya pay compensation to the families, and so I think we would have to deal with the reality of those interests.
Mr. PAYNE. We have a few friends that seem to have positive work relations with President Qadhafi, primarily former President Mandela and Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar, I believe his name is. Have we sought any of their assistance in negotiations, or do we just feel that—let me just tell you my interest and concern.

Of course, as I indicated in my opening statement and as you alluded to, the president of Togo and the president of Eritrea and the president of Liberia and the president of Uganda and the president of South Africa have all gone up to Libya. Evidently, there is some connection with sub-Saharan Africa, and in the past it has been alleged that Libya has supported conflicts, rebel people and so forth. So if this negative behavior could be turned into a positive force in Africa to deal with the conflicts in Ethiopia-Eritrea, in Sierra Leone, those fragile, fragile agreements that aren't being tested, the Congo, perhaps deal with some of the atrocities in the Sudan, at least—that would be a positive step at least for sub-Saharan Africa; and that is my concern and interest about whether we believe that Libya is moving truly in the right direction, because, if indeed there is some influence on these nations and evidently to have some influence by virtue of these presidents visiting Libya, then that could be perhaps turned into a positive influence on a continent which has had many years of conflict. That was primarily my interest.

Mr. NEUMANN. It is a very valid question and concern, and we are in a very interesting period right now. Our view has been that Libya has been a very unhelpful state in the past in its actions in the Congo, in Ethiopia and in Sudan and Sierra Leone. Recently, the Libyans have made a whole set of statements about an interest in stability. They have made comments favoring the peace agreement in Sierra Leone. For us the question now is, will the actions be congruent with the statements; and we really don't have enough information, and in many ways there just hasn't been enough time to have actions take place, let alone to find them out if they are secret. So it is something to which we are paying a lot of attention.

We would very much like it if the actions do measure up to the words, but at the same time, we are determined that we are not going to be trapped in analyzing actions one way or another because we want them to come out some way. They have to speak for themselves.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Appreciate your comments. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to ask Mr. Meeks and Ms. Lee if either has an opening statement before we go to their questions.

Does either of you have an opening statement you would like to make?

OK. Mr. Meeks of New York.

Mr. MECKS. My question is somewhat along the same line of where Mr. Payne left off. I am concerned with reference to us possibly being isolated with reference to our relationship to Libya.

Libya has always pumped oil to Western Europe, and recently Great Britain has resumed diplomatic relationships with Libya, and the U.N. Has temporarily removed sanctions because they say that they stepped forward, and we do see that, for example, when
our policy was wrong in South Africa, Libya's policy was right in South Africa, and they are doing what appears to be the main thing, at least working in the African continent.

Could we set a standard that is too high, that the country may never be able to meet, and we become the isolated country? Libya's economy—we have sanctions, but their economy, they expected a surplus budget this year. What effect are we having at all with our policy, and if we don't set a timetable or look at some of the other good things that they may have done, how will that affect our relationships diplomatically also?

Let me just say this finally, because the British Government said, the best way to deal with someone you had problems with is to talk with them; and if we are not talking with them, you can't resolve problems.

Mr. Neumann. I think you put your finger on a very important point and one that perhaps didn't get quite enough attention earlier. In the period before our initiative, this question of isolation was very much there. I think the initiative we took with the British was very successful in reversing that, and in fact, the resolution of the Security Council 1,192, which endorsed our approach to a trial in a third country and made it into a resolution, made it official, was unanimous, the first unanimous move on Libya in quite some time, and it added to the pressure on Libya.

As we have gone forward, this is at times a little delicate. We went into the last review of lifting sanctions, which is a strange exercise in a way because you are lifting something which does not exist in practice, but nevertheless, there it is; and there were some big worries that we would be isolated in the Council. There were also some worries expressed by some people here insisting, by God, we have to veto no matter what, and we were aware of both.

We determined that it was premature to lift sanctions until we had the standards met, but we proceeded in a way which I think was fairly successful. It was diplomacy at its best. We worked with the issues with the various states. We worked it with the British. We had a unified position with the British, and in the end of the day, we had a Council position that recognized that Libya had not yet done everything it needed to do. So we actually came out with a consensus statement and not one of isolation.

At least we are not isolated yet. In fact, I think we are much less isolated than we were.

The point that we are trying to get across not only to the Libyans, but internationally is exactly the point that you touched on, Mr. Meeks, that we are not setting the bar too high, that we are asking for very specific actions which Libya can make, and one of the reasons that we chose to have the meeting in New York with the British and the Secretary General and to invite the Libyans to that meeting was exactly for this purpose, to lay down in clear and very specific fashion the actions that would meet these criteria on compensation, on renouncing terrorism, responsibility and cooperating with the trial, so that, on the one hand, it is clear that this is not a sliding yardstick that we intend to play with, but on the other hand, it is clear to the Libyans that it has real meaning and intention, there are real things there that they have to do.
I think one of the first ones is the question of cooperation with the trial. I have great respect for the Scotch prosecutors who are going to conduct this trial, and I think they deserve every bit of backing to insist that if they say the Libyans need to hand over something for the trial they should get it, but if they get it, that is cooperation. So there are two sides to that, but I think the way we are proceeding is prudent, and I think it does take into account some of those concerns you raised.

Mr. MEEKS. My last question is, what road, if any—we just recently had the new prime minister of Israel visit us here and give us his vision for peace within the next 15 months. What role, if any, do you think that Libya and Mr. Qadhafi can play in that?

Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Qadhafi is saying he is becoming more supportive of Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian authority in the pursuit of peace. That statement is useful. I come back, of course, again and again to the fact that we have so many Libyan statements so recently about change that we need to measure them.

There was, for instance, an article published in Alhayat, one of the well-read Arab newspapers out of London, in which it was reported that Libya was telling a number of the rejectionist groups that they had to stand down and support the peace process; and I can tell you that in our efforts to follow up on that that the Palestinian authority believes this story has some truth to it. We don't yet have our own evidence.

If Libya is walking away from these groups or telling them to move in a different direction, and particularly if the Syrians are doing the same thing, as has been recently reported, that would be a pretty significant move, but these things must be checked out. They can't be assumed to be fact because one reads about them. So we need time, we need careful attention to see if the actions back up the words.

Mr. ROYCE. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very informative hearing, and I appreciate being able to participate in it.

Mr. Ambassador, I understand the notion that actions speak louder than words, and I certainly believe that we can't tolerate terrorism wherever it exists. Let me ask you a couple of questions with regard to our policy and our relationship with Libya. As Mr. Payne and Mr. Meeks have mentioned, Libya's role on the continent of Africa is an important focus.

Colonel Qadhafi, has been supportive of many of the liberation movements in Africa, at the same time that the United States, for instance, had actually banned and indicated that the ANC in South Africa was illegal, was a terrorist organization. Very recently Mr. Mandela played a very positive role in the Pan Am bombings and, the handing over not the Lockerbie bombing suspects.

How can Mr. Mandela be useful to the United States on the continent of Africa in making sure that the peace process is moved forward? I in listening to you today, I feel optimistic, and I also know that the U.S. could be an obstacle if we don't believe all of the conditions are being met. I want to make sure that the role that Libya is playing on the continent of Africa is not subverted or hindered by the U.S. not having full, normal relations.
Mr. Neumann. I guess I would have to say that I hope it is not the case.

I think there are two pieces of this. One is what is that role? It has been a very unhelpful role in the past. If it is now becoming a more helpful role, if it is now going to be a fact that they will really do things to support peace in Sierra Leone, that they will really stop adding weapons to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict and stop fishing about with the situation in the Sudan, I think we will become aware of that, and certainly those are actions we want to encourage.

I think there is an interesting case with Mr. Mandela, although, because of the way we are organized geographically—and the State Department is a little different from the way the Committee is organized. I don't have primary jurisdiction for anything south of the Sahara, and my African bureau colleagues probably want to keep it that way, but we had a period where we found that Mr. Mandela's personal loyalty to the backing he had received from Mr. Qadhafi was a little irritating when we were trying to keep sanctions in place.

Then you had a very active involvement by Mr. Mandela, as well as by the Saudis, which I recognized in my testimony and which was very helpful in reassuring the Libyans, as far as we understand what went on, that we did not have a secret agenda and that in fact it was in their interest to meet the international requirements to turn these people over.

We tried to be very clear with both South Africa and Saudi Arabia throughout that period, look, these are the things we mean, this is what we will do and this is what we will not do, please don't go tell the Libyans that we are going to move faster or do things that we don't intend to do. We tried to be very careful that nobody in their own dealings, in their own desire to be helpful would spin anything beyond what we were prepared to do. So we were very up front with them.

I don't know what they said to each other in those meetings, but I think—the reason I raise this is because I think part of the question will be us, how do we respond to Libyan actions. Part of the question will be, Libya, what actions do they take, will they really move forward on these things; but also part of it is going to be whether intermediaries like South Africa keep a clear eye on where we are and don't misperceive it—Libyans don't misperceive it, because you can get a lot of miscommunication out of things like that.

We are looking at each other over a 20-year gap of enormous suspicion, and we have been through some of this before. I was reviewing the record when we got into this and there was a period where Libyans in the early 1980's were insisting on their desire, or late 1970's were insisting on their desire for better relations and wanting to buy things and do various things. The only problem is, they were planning on killing a couple of our Ambassadors at the very same time. We didn't think these were actions were really congruent with what they were saying.

They are talking about a very different approach. You read some of the things that Colonel Qadhafi is saying in interviews about a new approach to Africa and a new situation that requires a new approach. They are very interesting. There are other things he says
about the American hegemony and how we have to be protected against them that are a little more worrisome.

It is not a full answer to your question, but it is as far as I can take it.

Ms. Lee. Thank you very much for that answer. I appreciate it, and I am learning more about U.S. policy toward Libya, as I listen to you today. Let me ask you another question regarding the 1986 bombing that killed Colonel Qadhafi's daughter. Is the bombing a factor in the discussions, or in our efforts now, as we try to normalize relations between the United States and Libya?

Mr. Neumann. It is not a factor in our diplomatic actions. Those are exactly where I have put them. It may be a psychological factor with Qadhafi. He talks about it in interviews, he talks about it with people he meets, but beyond that you would have to be a psychiatrist or a sociologist, rather than a diplomat, I think, to have a more dependable answer to your question, but we bombed in retaliation for his bombing us. There were casualties. We felt and do feel that that was legitimate action at the time in view of the attacks on us.

Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.

Mr. Payne. Would you yield a second? I was just curious about that, and the fact that you had asked that question, that it did seem to go a step beyond the retaliation. I think there perhaps should be retaliation, if someone strikes you in world politics and world conflicts you generally have to strike back or you will find yourself continually struck at, but it did seem to be a turn in policy where personal families were done. I recall Joshua N. Cuomo was attempted to be killed by the South African security forces when he was living in Zambia and they moved up and blew his house up; but he was not there, fortunately for him, and it was talked about as a new low in world leaders fighting each other in combat to go to the personal home and try to kill the family, and so I just thought that was sort of a turn in war to go at the individual and the family.

Mr. Royce. If you could yield, though. It was my understanding that we lost a couple of servicemen and that this particular individual gave the order to kill our U.S. servicemen. The reason he was targeted was because we lost U.S. servicemen, who were assassinated in Berlin under his orders, and so when you have identified the source of who has given the order to assassinate U.S. troops, it would seem to me you are better served—I am afraid we are getting off of the topic here, but I am going to speak to this—you are better served by identifying the target who gave the order rather than bombing his people. It doesn't make a lot of sense to try to identify anyone other than the individual who gave the order for the assassination.

From my standpoint, I happened to visit the White House. I was in the State Senate, but I remember speaking to President Reagan on that day that we undertook that bombing, and I will say that it didn't seem to be a nonsequitur to me. There was a direct correlation. He gave the order to kill U.S. troops, and there was a countermanding order as a deterrent in the future to anyone else who would try to do that.
Mr. Payne. I agree and I feel the same way you feel about the loss of our servicemen.

There has been war since the Crusades, 1400's. Someone gives—the leader, heads of state give commands to do actions, and it doesn't make any head of state right by doing it, but my point was that in war you fight wars, you fight against armies and you do bomb cities, as was done in World War II, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, but to go after a family, that is my—I oppose war in general, period, but the fact remains that it was not the first time that there were casualties of a country, that did not go after the immediate family of that country.

That is my whole point, and I feel the same way about the loss of our soldiers also, so don't get me wrong there. I was just talking about the manner in which you prosecute a war. War is bad, but for it to be prosecuted by going to the home, the White House of the head of that nation, I just wouldn't want to see that happen in wars in the future in our country. If we give a command to attack someone I wouldn't want anyone to go to the White House, whoever is in the White House, to bomb it.

Mr. Royce. I thank you, and I thank the Ambassador for his testimony here today. Now we will go to the next panel at this time. Thank you, Ambassador Neumann.

Mr. Royce. We will ask our second panel to take their seats at this time.

I will mention to our witnesses that Members of the Committee have your statements. We appreciate your coming so far to testify. We have people from all over the United States that have come today for this testimony. We thank you. We are going to ask you, since we have your original testimony and have read that to summarize your testimony. We are going to hold you to 5 minutes for your original statement.

I will briefly introduce our panel. Dr. Ray Takeyh is a Soref Research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He obtained his Ph.D. in Modern History from Oxford. He has authored numerous articles in prominent journals and newspapers and is the author of a forthcoming book, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The United States, Britain, and Nasser's Egypt.

Dr. Joseph Sinai is a specialist on international security issues, particularly the military capability of developing world states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and low-intensity conflict. He has published several articles about Libya's weapons of mass destruction, and his articles range from the Washington Post to Jane's Intelligence Review. He is currently a consultant to the International Security Division of Analytic Services, Incorporated.

Mr. Omar Turbi is a Libyan-American born in Derna, Libya. He is a founding Member of the Libyan Human Rights Commission, a nonpolitical human rights organization. He is also an advisor to the American Arab antidiscrimination Committee, the largest Arab-American grass-roots organization, and he has done work with the World Conference on Human Rights. Mr. Turbi holds degrees in engineering and international relations and business.

Dr. Mansour El-Kikhia is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas in San Antonio. He has written
exclusively on Libya, and he is author of *Libya's Qadhafi: The Politics of Contradiction*.

We welcome you to the Subcommittee and look forward to your remarks, but again, please do that within the timeframe of 5 minutes.

Mr. ROYCE. We will start with Dr. Ray Takeyh.

**STATEMENTS OF DR. RAY TAKEYH, SOREF FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY**

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me today, and I will keep my comments as short as possible.

As the Members of the Committee know, Mu'ammar Qadhafi has recently proclaimed his affinity for pan-Africanism and has seemingly ushered in a new era in Libya's foreign policy. In the recent months, Colonel Qadhafi has emerged as a mediator of various African crises and has held a series of high-level discussions with a variety of African leaders. The critical question is whether this is a new era and whether Qadhafi's policy will contribute to regional stability. After decades of professing Arabism, Qadhafi's African orientation, is it genuine or not?

Libya's policy toward continental Africa can be, I think, conveniently delineated in two specific stages, the revolutionary stage and the more pragmatic one. The 1970's and 1980's can be viewed as the height of Libya's revolutionary activism as Qadhafi sought to undermine a series of regimes that he found ideologically objectionable. In the 1990's, Qadhafi's international isolation has induced a more pragmatic policy toward the continent. A more detailed survey, a relatively more detailed survey of Qadhafi's approach toward Africa would reveal that whatever posture the colonel embraces, he has long perceived African and Third World interests as best served through a recession of Western power.

Libya's policy in the 1970's reflected the primacy of ideology in Qadhafi's calculation. Soon after coming to power he became an important source of opposition to conservative African regimes, but also generously supported liberation movements in South Africa, Rhodesia and Angola. At a second and complementary level, Libya emerged at that time as an important supporter of Islamism through establishment of the Jihad Fund and Islamic Legions. The essence of Qadhafi's policy in the 1970's was to assist all forces that sought to destabilize pro-Western regimes and foster a new alignment in Africa.

The 1980's, the aggressive nature of Libya's policy was denoted by its intervention in Chad and continuous interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries. This caused much disenchantment throughout Africa. In the meantime, Libya's propagation of Islam exacerbated internal religious divisions in states which are religiously diverse, such as Sudan. Even Libya's foreign aid became a source of contention as it arrived with ample strings and reflecting Tripoli's determination to gain access to natural resources of other states.

In the 1990's, Qadhafi has encountered enormous difficulty. The decline of the petroleum market has crystallized Libya's structural economic problems. On the international level, Libya found itself under a debilitating sanctions regime and international ostracism
arising from the 1988 Lockerbie affair. The confluence of these factors led Qadhafi to embark on reorientation of his policy and rebuild his base among the nonaligned countries, particularly African. A more chastened Qadhafi departed Chad and intimated to the OAU his readiness to accept rules of conduct. In turn, the OAU was the first regional organization to defy the sanctions, and President Nelson Mandela took the lead in resolving the Lockerbie crisis and lifting sanctions.

The post-Lockerbie period has witnessed a continuation of Libya’s pragmatic diplomacy. Qadhafi, as mentioned, has emerged as a leading mediator of the Great Lakes crisis and of course the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The colonel brokered the accord leading to the departure of Chadian forces from Congo and an apparent reconciliation between Congo and Uganda.

Qadhafi has also been instrumental in attempting to convince the many internal factions in Congo to resume discussions and arrive at some sort of reconciliation. Although less successful in resolving difficulties between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Qadhafi has attempted to facilitate negotiations leading to a compromise accord. The critical question is whether Qadhafi has abandoned his revolutionary radicalism and ceased basing his policy on uncompromising ideological precepts.

The most plausible explanation for Qadhafi’s activism in Africa is that it is part of a comprehensive diplomatic initiative that encompasses both Africa and the Arab realms. The basis of this new diplomacy may still the Lockerbie affair. Despite Qadhafi’s feigned indifference to the trial, Lockerbie does loom large in his calculations.

It is important to stress, as Ambassador Neumann did, that the arrest of the two suspects does not end the Lockerbie issue, as ebbs and flows of the trial can still affect the sanctions regime. The United States and international community have refused to permanently lift the sanctions, which implies that implicating evidence arising from a trial or a potential conviction of the suspects could still expose Libya to an even more stringent sanctions regime.

In any potential conflict with the United States, Qadhafi will require the aid of the African states and the support of OAU. At any rate, the rehabilitation of Libya’s image on the continent and construction of alliances buttressed by aid could prevent Libya from being isolated, should the Lockerbie crisis resurface.

At a second level, Qadhafi may be attempting to exploit the crisis to further his strategic goals; certainly the coalition of states, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Namibia, that support Kabila’s regime in Congo have close relations with Libya. In the meantime, Qadhafi’s relationship with Kabila goes back to the 1980’s, when he was one of the few states to support his obscure rebellion. Certainly Kabila in power is consistent with Qadhafi’s ideological and strategic designs, and it gives him a base in central Africa and an important ally in the OAU. In the meantime, the Horn of Africa has been the scene of competition by many states, including Egypt. A resurrected Libya may view its diplomatic initiatives as a means of asserting its influence in a region that is admittedly critical to security.
It is undeniable that Libya in the post-Lockerbie period has played a constructive role in Africa. To escape his international isolation, Qadhafi has embarked on certain pragmatic shifts of power. However, it is too soon to accept the rhetoric of mediation as evidence of a fundamental Libyan reorientation. Qadhafi is an ideology who genuinely believes in the applicability of his ideas to the Third World. More than any other leader, Qadhafi has not made the transition from a revolutionary to a statesman. Although capable of much alteration, Qadhafi’s historical conduct has to be viewed as part of his record, and it is still unclear to determine whether Libya has dispensed with its radical heritage and assumed a responsible position in the community of nations, but we should approach Libya with a more open mind, assume the possibility of Libya beginning to move in a positive direction and acknowledge those steps.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. We now go to Dr. Sinai. We do have your testimony, so if you will, please abbreviate it to 5 minutes. Go ahead, sir

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA SINAI, CONSULTANT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, ANALYTIC SERVICES, INC.

Mr. SINAI. Thank you very much for providing me an opportunity to address the Subcommittee on the subject of Libya's weapons of mass destruction program. This a topic that unfortunately has received very little attention in the media, public policy and academic communities, but which I believe deserves close scrutiny because Libya has one of the most ambitious chemical and biological weapons programs in the Third World.

Libya is on the verge of succeeding in developing a weapons of mass destruction capability in the form of chemical and biological weaponry and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. The $25 billion Great Man-Made River Project, massive network of underground pipes are reportedly connected to some of the chemical and biological facilities, particularly the Tarhuna chemical weapons facility.

However, Libya's chemical and biological weapons program has received very little international attention, while much attention has been paid to the large-scale chemical and biological programs of Iran and Iraq and an alleged terrorist group-affiliated chemical weapons plant in Sudan. In fact, according to published accounts, Iraq has sent several contingents of scientists and technicians to work at Libyan chemical and biological weapons facilities, either to assist in accelerating Tripoli's CBW Program or to evade international inspection of its own CBW facilities.

As a result of these developments, while Libya is threatening to become a proliferator of chemical and biological weaponry, it is also emerging as a facilitator for other rogue states’ CBW Programs. In the area of developing a nuclear weapons capability, or long-range ballistic missiles, however, the Libyans have not been as successful in CBW because of post-Pan Am 103 international nonproliferation sanctions and a lack of adequate financial or indigenous resources or manpower expertise.
It is particularly significant today to investigate the actual threat potential posed by Libya’s chemical and biological weapons program in light of several recent developments that appear to indicate a willingness by Libya to reenter the international community as a peaceful nation. At the same time, however, there have also been several news reports about impending deals by Libya to acquire a nuclear reactor from Russia and the latest No Dong ballistic missile from North Korea, which would indicate that it has no intention of reducing its efforts to construct an ambitious weapons of mass destruction program.

There is a great need to investigate and assess the extent of the progress made by Libya’s chemical and biological weapons program, including the nature of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi’s motivation in developing such capability. Such an understanding is necessary in order to formulate effective countermeasures and policies.

Because of time restrictions, I am speeding through my remarks. The Libyan biological weapon program is reportedly in the early stages of research and development primarily because the country lacks an adequate scientific and technical base. However, it is reported to be on the verge of developing an indigenous biological weapons capability.

Libya’s chemical weapons program is considered to be its most successful WMD effort. Its chemical weapons capabilities are concentrated in the Rabta and Tarhuna plants and include a stockpile of up to 100 tons of chemical agents.

Tarhuna is the most significant chemical weapons facility in Libya, and unfortunately, very little has been published about it in the open press. Libya’s efforts to acquire chemical and biological weapons are matched with an ambitious program to acquire or indigenously develop long-range ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers.

As I have stated in my presentation, there are a number of areas in Libya’s weapons of mass destruction program that require close international scrutiny.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sinai appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. El-Kikhia.

STATEMENT OF EL-KIKHIA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. Yes. Thank you very much for inviting me to speak before you today. If I may, I would not like to give a summary of my paper. You already have it, so I want to talk about something else, if possible, and I want to discuss just a few things in the 5 minutes that I have of my impression of what Mr. Neumann said in the conversation between you and him.

I really was impressed, first of all, by what Mr. Payne said, and Mr. Meeks said as well. They made excellent points. First of all, your point is quite right and I think that perhaps it is a bit too early to even discuss the future of U.S. relations on the one hand, because we don’t have all the facts.
The second point, Mr. Meeks says that I think you are very right there, too, because the country that is being isolated is the United States, not Libya. There was an embargo on Libya for quite some time, but the majority of the embargo was dealing with air travel. Libya could still buy stuff on the market. Who benefited from this? The truth of who benefited: our allies. The Germans were still selling to him, the Italians were selling to him, even the British were selling him goods, perhaps not certain commodities that the embargo restricted, but on the other hand, it was an open market. True, the people who suffered most were Libyans because they could only travel through Egypt and Tunisia, and those two countries boomed as well.

As far as European business, European business flourished within Libya itself. American companies were excluded, of course. Initially, there were a number of loopholes during the Bush administration which were closed when Mr. Clinton came to power, shutting out American companies from dealing in Libya, but Europeans filled the gap very quickly. The Man-Made River that my colleague talks about over here was constructed by a Korean company.

Let me put some things in perspective. First of all, we are talking about a country that has less than 5 million people with an annual income less than what Americans spend on pet food annually. Let us look at things in the correct shape.

Libya’s intervention in Africa is not really due to Libya’s strength in Africa as much as it is due to American weakness there. We have, until now, left the arena open for any country to engage in African affairs. We have left Africa out of our foreign policy. I was hoping that when Mr. Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor for Mr. Clinton, as an Africanist, would in fact be more involved in Africa; but unfortunately, no, America was not involved in Africa. We have thus far relied on two allies, on the French and the British, saying this is their sphere of influence, forgetting that the Africans dislike precisely those two countries.

When we talk about how come Qadhafi helped support these terrorist movements, or which we call “terrorist movements”—indeed, we once considered the ANC as a terrorist organization—but when we have to look seriously, we supported a dictator like Mobutu Sese Seko that led to kleptomanic regime for so many years, and then we are surprised that somebody else would support revolution against Mobutu. We shouldn’t be. So we have left, in fact, that vacuum for other countries to fill in Africa.

Libya is a small country. Its military is antiquated. It still uses Soviet weapons of 1970’s vintage, and those weapons have demonstrated their ability in the Gulf War. Even far more sophisticated weapons could not stand up to America’s might or European might. So let us put things in context.

Libya is not a country that is going to destroy the world. Its income is limited. Its population is limited. Its leader has fancy ideas and lots of dreams, but after all, I think they are merely dreams. If America wants to put an end to Qadhafi in Africa, then it must pay attention to Africa because the continent is poor, and any little bit of funding which Qadhafi has—and he only has a little bit of funding—can make a very, very big difference.
Let me stop here and perhaps we can talk a little bit more about that.

Mr. Royce. We thank you, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. El-Kikhia appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Royce. Mr. Turbi.

STATEMENT OF A OMAR TURBI, LIBYAN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST

Mr. Turbi. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. I will be delivering a brief statement to my prepared statement. I am quite honored to have the opportunity to appear before your distinguished Committee.

I am really proud to be a Libyan American, and believe me, I have every reason to be. I started a business about 15 years ago with absolutely no money. Today, I do business in more than 50 countries around the world, thanks to the land of opportunity, freedom and democracy.

Over 10 days ago I took my three boys, who are behind me here, to the Women's World Cup, and I am sure we all watched it, enjoyed it immensely; and throughout the game I felt and was engulfed with an immense emotional feeling that brought tears to my eyes. There was a large group of Chinese Americans sitting not too far away from us, waving the Chinese flag and supporting their native team, and every time they waved the flag, my little boys, one who is only 8 years old, would say, “Dad, yell ‘democracy’ to those Chinese people. Yell ‘democracy’ to those Chinese people.” I hope someday I will see a Libyan and an American team under the same setting. I hope someday that we can do that.

I am truly happy to have and take part in these hearings as an advocate of normalizing our relationship with the Libyan regime and the Libyan people through constructive engagements. The handing over of the two Libyan suspects and suspension of sanctions are positive steps toward that goal.

American history would remind all of us here that we engaged the Libyans, as a matter of fact, as early as the year 1801. The United States Treasury then was paying as much as one-fifth of its annual revenue to Tripoli and the Barbary Coast pirate states as ransom for captured American officials and for the safe passage of American ships in the Mediterranean.

Another piece of the American Libyan history is the dress uniform sword carried by our Marine officers today and its Libyan origins. I am also reminded every time I hear the Marine march line singing “From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli.”

Ladies and gentlemen, such historical ties between Americans and Libyans spanning 200 years must set the tone for a constructive engagement. Our dialogue with China resulted in a flourishing business relationship, other examples like Vietnam, Cambodia, and South Africa. Let us not forget some of the best trading partners today were our enemies in World War II, namely, Mussolini-Italy, Japan, and Germany.

Ladies and gentlemen, U.N. sanctions and embargoes on Libya imposed as far back as 1981 crippled the economic structure and
social fabric of the Libyan people, degraded the quality of life and exasperated human rights efforts.

I would call for an immediate lifting of U.N. sanctions and the gradual—and I emphasize the word “gradual”—move toward the eventual total normalization of relations with the Libyan regime. This would be in the interest of the American and Libyan people.

We must also pay attention to this. A policy based on enlightened self-interest is far superior to one driven by strictly economic or political interests alone. Let our foreign policy be consistent with American values. The requirements for civil society must supersede narrowly defined endeavors.

The Libyan people, ladies and gentlemen, are presently in a quandary, and I really mean it. On the one hand, they suffered and are barely recovering under crippling U.N. sanctions that lasted nearly 10 years, while at the same time, they are oppressed by a brutal regime which has exhibited and continues to exhibit total disregard for human dignity. Freedom of speech, expression and assembly are nonexistent, and I am very disappointed that nobody here has talked about human rights issues in Libya so far.

To move forward with full normalization and without regard to the human rights dimension would be un-American. Lip service alone will not do, and I emphasize that. We must set specific conditions prior to total normalization that should include the immediate release of all conscience and political prisoners; the establishment of a fact-finding committee to visit with prisoners; and the call for gradual implementation of democratic reforms. It is in the best interest of America and the Libyan people to call on the Libyan regime with such conditions now. If we do not aggressively pursue these goals at this time, the Libyan regime will assume that we acquiesce its ill treatment of its people, and that would be a tragedy.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. We will take note.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turbi appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. We have been joined by three of our colleagues: Mr. Campbell of California, Mr. Tancredo of Colorado, and Mr. Chabot of Ohio, and I want to thank all of our four witnesses for making the trip out here and for their statements.

At this time, I will ask a couple of questions Dr. Takeyh, you mentioned the peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Libya has offered peacekeepers to this conflict. Given the recently signed Congo peace agreement, is it likely that Libya will have a future role in the Congo?

Mr. TAKEYH. I think, to take the point of Dr. El-Kikhia, it is important not to exaggerate. Libya did send 60 to 70 peacekeepers to Uganda, and they have not left their hotel room yet. It is possible that Libya will have a role in the peacekeeping missions, but that depends on an extent on American consent and acquiescence, and thus far, the United States has intimated that it will not accept Libyan participation in such multilateral efforts, but it is unlikely that Libya can resolve the Congo crisis on its own. It is certainly unlikely Libya can exacerbate it. The crisis in central Africa is enormously complex, and it reflects a confluence of factors, institutional decay, the decomposition of state in Congo.
Libya can potentially play a marginally constructive role, but not a substantial role in any efforts in Congo, and those efforts are being spearheaded by the South African development community, led by Zambia and, of course, South Africa itself. Libya can be an adjunct to those efforts and can potentially have a useful role, but not a substantial or a negative or a positive.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Turbi, in your testimony you advocate lifting sanctions on Libya and gradually normalizing diplomatic relations with Libya, with this normalization basically being pegged to the advancement of human rights in Libya.

What if Libya does not make progress? Would this be a reason to freeze any movement toward normalization, and could you maybe just tell us a little more in terms of your suggestion—of how the State Department might tie this to advancement of human rights?

Mr. TURBI. I think, having listened to the Honorable Ambassador Neumann earlier on speak of the limited engagement that the U.S. Administration has had with Libya, I am somewhat disappointed in the fact that we all live on a small planet. A lot of enemies talk to each other, and I advocate the following: that we must have direct human and constructive contact with the Libyan regime, regardless of how bad we think they might be.

I must caution that in promoting anything that we want to promote with the Libyan regime is to make sure that we are not viewed by the regime that are in pursuit of toppling the regime, either covertly or overtly. I think if we move in a deliberate and calculated manner on those fronts—and in the process, we must promote democracy and human rights—there is no reason to freeze the relationship at any point in time.

Mr. ROYCE. I see. I will turn to our ranking member. We are going to allow him to ask some questions here because I think a vote is almost upon us.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

I listened to Dr. Sinai when you talked about the ability of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction that Libya has, and one of the things that strikes me is that it seems, as we move forward in time, that many countries seem like they are going to be able to acquire the ability—North Korea, China, Pakistan, India, and so forth—and I don’t know if any of you might want to tackle it. Since it seems like it is going to be impossible to prevent the manufacture or the development, with technology and people, it even goes beyond Libya, what do you think we ought to be doing as a nation that is concerned about mass destruction or rogue states?

Do you think we should try to go in and destroy places that have it? Do you think that there ought to be an opportunity to rework a world treaty to try to work toward elimination of them? Because you are going to find some little country down in Southeast Asia that is going to be able to work it out pretty soon also.

You all are Ph.D.’s, so maybe you can tell us old congressmen something here.
Mr. SINAI. You have raised some very important issues which I agree with. There are a number of steps that can be taken, short of a military campaign. I think the first step is a public diplomacy effort by the West to highlight and to focus on Libya's chemical and biological weapons program. Also, an effort by journalists, and investigative journalists, to try to uncover what is really going on.

Second and another step might be for the United Nations Security Council to dispatch an inspection team to Libya to verify the country's compliance on this issue, and I think that, because Libya appears to be willing to rejoin the international community as a peaceful nation, that now might be an appropriate time to press on the Security Council to establish such a mission.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. I think you are going around to the issue of sovereignty. You cannot impose it upon Libya, or you cannot impose it upon Egypt or Israel or Turkey or somebody else. I mean, basically the Congressman is quite right in this thing, do we want to go the international route, and in the international route, you might have something like the nonproliferation treaty, where you have 130, 140 countries signing it, but then it takes effort to enact into law. But it seems difficult to me to say, we want you to open up so we can inspect; and the one next door, who has the same thing—say, You are OK with us, but you are not OK with us. That becomes very difficult indeed.

Mr. SINAI. But not every country has been involved in international terrorism to the extent that Libya has. Until recently, Libya harbored terrorists. It has terrorist camps. It hasn't been directly involved in terrorist activities in the 1990's, but it has a very significant past history in this area.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. I agree with you. From that point, I agree with you.

Mr. SINAI. Qadhafi has also assassinated rivals.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. I have no love for Qadhafi, don't get me wrong, but what you must understand is that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Some countries in the world agree with Qadhafi. Others do not agree with Qadhafi, but you can't apply one rule against Qadhafi and another to somebody else. The international system will not allow you to do that.

Mr. ROYCE. There is something called international law, but we will go to Mr. Tancredo for his question.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two actually, if we have time for them.

I take by the comments earlier that—Dr. El-Kikhia, that you may not think it would be productive to explore the possibilities that may develop if Mr. Qadhafi is no longer on the scene. So you may not wish to respond to this, but if anyone else on the panel has some ideas about what might be the future, what we might be looking at in terms of a governmental structure in Libya and the individuals, more specifically the individuals who might rise to that challenge if Mr. Qadhafi were gone, I would certainly love to hear what that might be. That is my first question. So anybody who has some ideas along those lines let me know.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. I will be the first to be happy to see Mr. Qadhafi go out of power. He has been there for 30 years and my colleague here Mr. Turbi is quite right, no one suffered more on under Qa-
dhafi’s rule like the Libyans. All Libyans have suffered. The standard of living in Libya has declined tremendously since 1970. Libyan income has declined by 3 percent every year since then. If anyone has to complain it is the Libyans. They look forward to seeing the end of Qadhafi.

Mr. TANCREDO. Dr. El-Kikhia, don’t get me wrong. I was referring to a statement you made something about, I think it was the question posed to the Ambassador earlier and you said, in terms of the future we just don’t know. So I didn’t think you had an opinion but if you have it, I would like to hear it.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. American-Libyan relationship in the future I think is too early to determine what it is going to be like. We don’t know what Qadhafi does. He is so idiosyncratic, so incremental, but Mr. Turbi is quite right in the sense that it is better to establish a relationship, even with Qadhafi, to change some of his policies, even though indirectly, than not to have a relationship with him at all.

Mr. TANCREDO. We don’t have time to really go into that part. I still want to know, who do you think might succeed him and what will it look like?

Mr. TAKEYH. In terms of succession in Libya, succession in Libya is most difficult to decipher because for long Libya has not had a coherent state structure. The most likely successors to Qadhafi are likely to be members within the armed forces themselves. It is unlikely that the post-Qadhafi Libya will move toward a parliamentary democratic society. Now, Dr. El-Kikhia’s book has outlined numerous personalities, and most of us rely on his analysis on those names and personalities he has.

Mr. TANCREDO. I just better get the book.

Mr. TAKEYH. It is likely to be members within the armed forces.

Mr. TANCREDO. No significant change in direction?

Mr. TAKEYH. That is just it. There are likely to be some significant changes. It is unlikely the members within the Libyan armed forces are going to have as grandiose aspirations as Qadhafi. They are likely to remain concentrated to internal challenges and immediate challenges in the Maghreb, but they are likely to be involved in civil wars in the Philippines or Argentina and so on. So post-Qadhafi regime is likely to be a regime more concerned with its immediate internal affairs and immediate regional neighbors, Maghreb.

Mr. TURBI. From the perspective of hoping that we might have democracy in Libya, Libya did experience democracy in the past during the King Idris reign when it had a specific constitution that was drafted and given to Libya to use by the United Nations and so forth, and then during the Qadhafi era, there has only been a nonconventional way of running things in the country.

I have also read Mr. Kikhia’s book, too. He describes it as being a controlled chaos in some ways. It is very hard to determine any place in the world that does not have any conventional constitution to either go in a heartbeat or stay for a long time. So the makeup of the Libyan people as a whole has many democratic elements in it, inside or outside.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. One more thing to add to your point. You see, you must understand even the present system that Qadhafi has set
up, although I do call it controlled chaos, should it work, I think it would be very democratic; but the problem is he won’t let it work because he has to control it. It is very difficult when you deal with regimes like this because they are idiosyncratic regimes, and events rotate around them.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. The same question comes back to Castro. When Castro is gone, what kind of system are we going to have in Cuba?

Mr. TANCREDO. But you have a Ph.D.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. I do, but I am missing something, a fortune ball.

Mr. ROYCE. We have, I think, with us the Libyan desk officer. Is he here?

She is here. Make sure the notes that you take here from the panelists are given to the Ambassador. We would like him to follow the dialogue and the discussion of the Committee. You will do that for us, right?

Thank you very much. We will follow up on that.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. I will stay with that topic that we have been talking about, diplomacy, talking, regime after Qadhafi.

I would imagine that within the country of Libya there are negative viewpoints of some of the Western nations, particularly the United States; and if, in fact, something happened to Qadhafi and we had not improved our relationships with that, I would imagine that that kind of stereotypical situation would continue.

Let me tell you where I am going. I agree with you. I recently went to Cuba, for example, and said, what would happen after Castro left? I saw every country there, but America; and I thought that if America was there, it would make all the difference to the people, forget Castro.

The deal is with reference to how do we benefit the people because the people-to-people contact is what is most important. So for me, what I am trying to decide, how do we get to the point where we can talk?

You know we talked about weapons, if I was a small country and I had people around me that had some weapons, that I am going to say, I want some also because I’ve got to protect myself. That is what happens, everybody around wants and no one talks to one another, and you just have the buildup of weapons.

It might be kind of elementary, but for me, if I was walking down the street and somebody came up to me with a stick, I am not going to try to fight without a stick, I am going to pick something up, so I can defend myself, and I think that is what is happening in that whole region, and we have got to look for some kind of way to turn that around.

So I guess my question is, I know that we have got to look at what Libya has done, particularly with reference to terrorism, but because—I like Great Britain made a great step and others are making steps and recently, you can tell me what it means with the OAU. I know that Mr. Qadhafi attended the OAU meeting. In fact, he is going to host one in September. What does that mean? Is that something that we can get involved in, also with the OAU maybe, so that we can through that organization begin to evolve some better diplomatic relations?
Mr. E L-KIKHIA. Congressman, I think as whole it has received much of the support from Africa and some other countries at least because of one issue. I think it is the issue of proportionality. I think there is, even though not overtly, but covertly, there is an understanding among many of these states that if I aim at you with a gun, you don't aim at me with a nuclear bomb, OK? It is understandable, but it is regrettable and maybe Libya is responsible for the Pan Am crisis.

Hearing Mr. Neumann, Ambassador Neumann, and the three points he made—cease terrorism, be responsible with actions of officials, cooperate with the trial and pay compensation. When you put it like this, I think there should be an addendum over here, if those people are found guilty. I mean, unless we have to assume the French way of being guilty until proven innocent, but I think we operate under the assumption of innocent until proven guilty.

I think the support that Qadhafi and Libya got throughout Africa and the Middle East is really because of the issue of proportionality that you cannot punish a people for 10 years, because of an incident somebody did. There has to be an issue of proportionality over here, and listen, 3 years ago Qadhafi made the same proposal of not delivering those two individuals to either Britain or the United States, but some other neutral country; and we refused that, we refused precisely the same proposal? He made it a long time ago, but we refused that.

But I think the American administration right now understands, as well as the British, that if they did not go along with Qadhafi, others will start breaking the embargo because, again, the issue of proportionality. The punishment has to fit the crime somehow, and I think this support came precisely from the OAU and other African countries.

Mr. ROYCE. We are out of time. We are going to go to Mr. Chabot of Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will address my question to any of the panel members that would like to pick up on any one of the questions I will ask and be happy to hear from you, and if you covered this in testimony that I might not have been here for, I apologize.

Have we heard anything about Qadhafi’s health at this point? What kind of condition is he in right now? What is the extent of the domestic opposition to the Qadhafi regime? What do we know about the reported assassination attempts on Qadhafi over the last several years? Is there any serious threat to the Qadhafi rule?

Mr. T AKEYH. Qadhafi is only 57 years old. I mean, in a region where people rule to considerably older than that, he is more likely than not to remain in power. Qadhafi’s regime has been plagued by internal disturbances and difficulties. It is very difficult to get reliable information, but there seems to have been an assassination attempt about 2 years ago in which he was injured reportedly because his bodyguards fell on him.

It is hard to say whether there is a credible internal opposition to Qadhafi. He has been very successful in neutralizing that, and he has for the past 30 years survived numerous coups and has instituted elaborate security measures which have weakened the armed forces; and that weakness of the armed forces was particu-
larly exhibited in Chad when the members of the military unit could not speak to each other without going through central authority.

I would say more likely than not, Qadhafi will remain in power, and the logical path to improvement or dealing with Libya is the assumption that Qadhafi will remain in power as opposed to start holding relations in abeyance until there is a post-Qadhafi regime. That is entirely speculative.

Mr. CHABOT. Does anybody else want to add anything else to it?

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. I think you bring up a very good point, too. Qadhafi is so obsessed with security he doesn’t sleep in the same place twice. The pressure is phenomenal on him. There have been a number of attempts I think 6 months ago there was an attempted coup against him, and actually a grenade was thrown at him, but it didn’t explode. It did not explode at all.

He is young. He is still young. He is in his fifties, and there is no reason why he can’t go on until his eighties.

You see, more important, I call it controlled chaos because you have a situation where he forestalls these coups from taking place. I will give you a simple example in the military.

Rank doesn’t really mean too much. You can be a general in the military, you can be a colonel, but if you are not a member of the revolutionary committee, a member in the revolutionary committee who is a private may give you an order. So, you see, you would like to put some order to disorder based on your own experience within a society where there is rank and file and there is a hierarchy of things. In Libya, things don’t work that way. They don’t work that way at all.

Mr. SINAI. I would like to make one observation about that. Qadhafi has transformed the armed forces and has abolished the rank of general. That is why he is known as Colonel Qadhafi.

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Sinai, let me ask you one question, too. You said something about the potential of a U.S. or, excuse me, an inspection team of some sort because of the weapons of mass destruction program, et cetera. What makes you think that that would be any more successful than Iraq, where it seems like the inspectors went in the front door and the trucks are loading up and going out the back door? I don’t feel particularly confident that we were making the progress that maybe the public was led to think we were making there.

Would you like to comment on that?

Mr. SINAI. One reason it may be more effective is that Qadhafi appears to be willing to rejoin the international community as a peaceful nation. This would be one test to validate the sincerity of his commitment.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have a question that is for any member of the panel. It is the most important question I want to ask, and then I will ask a second one if I have time, but this is the one I want to ask first. The bombing of Benghazi and Tripoli under President Reagan is frequently brought forward in the circles of politics and government where I participate—admittedly at a very low level—as the example that, “you see, Qadhafi
he changed his behavior, we bombed and his support for terrorism changed. We bombed and he altered his behavior.”

I heard, and for the life of me I can’t tell you where, nor if it is official, but I heard that several years thereafter we became convinced that Qadhafi was not responsible for the La Belle disco bombing in Europe, which was a predicate for our bombing Libya. Then I thought, maybe it was a very successful strategy; Qadhafi must have thought we were nuts to bomb when they weren’t responsible, and maybe this created a very good deterrent, although a very strange one, to think we would bomb him for some act that he did not do, just because he might have.

I have got to tell you this argument is alive and well today. People still argue, “look, see, we got Qadhafi to change because we bombed,” and if I bring up the fact that subsequent evidence proved he wasn’t the one at fault, people don’t seem to remember that. Maybe my fact premise is false. So I would like the opinion of any member of the panel, what effect did that bombing have on Qadhafi’s behavior, because the myth is, as I have described it; and if it is a myth, I would like to have that exposed, and if it is true, I would like to know that as well.

The second question, is this. I know President Isayas of Eritrea visited Qadhafi recently, and I am troubled about any possible play of Libya in the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, but the first question is the one that concerns me most.

Mr. T AKEYH. One thing I will say is that the bombing of 1986, it is unclear whether it changed Qadhafi’s policies or not. There were other factors in the late 1980’s including the decline of the petroleum market and others that placed stress on Qadhafi’s regime, but it did exacerbate internal dissension, particularly within the military, as it exposed it to further risks that it was unwilling to bear, particularly at the time when Libya’s economy began to disintegrate. So it did cause members of the military, which is the only institution cohesive enough to succeed Qadhafi in Libya, to be further suspicious of Qadhafi’s conduct.

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. The other factor here, I have heard it from more than one source is that perhaps it was a renegade Palestinian group, Syria might have been involved in the process as well and even Iran. I mean, the funny thing is that the United States does not present the proof, citing that it was to preserve its intelligence sources, but you must understand something which I think really may be a fault in American foreign policymaking, and I think the executive branch used that often not only to convince us, or outsiders, but also to convince you. What do they do?

The executive branch basically exaggerates the threat and oversells the solution constantly. So you make Qadhafi this huge ogre.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Time is running out. I am sorry. On the specific example, did Qadhafi alter his behavior following the bombing?

Mr. EL-KIKHIA. Qadhafi has always been an opportunist, so whenever he feels that the opportunity is there, he will move; then he backs off and sees the reaction. I don’t think he changed the behavior so much. He just chose a different route, different way.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Dr. Sinai, do you have any point of view or, Mr. Turbi, do you have any point of view on this?
Mr. Sinai. I would like to come back to the idea of proportionality. Libya’s weapons of mass destruction do pose a threat. Former CIA Director John Deutch has called Tarhuna, the chemicals weapons plant, the largest chemical weapons facility in the Third World. Why has it been built? Is it a pharmaceutical facility?

Mr. Campbell. Do you remember my question? Could you respond to my question? Did Qadhafi alter his behavior after we bombed?

Mr. Sinai. I think it did constrain his behavior to some extent, and the sanctions have also constrained his behavior.

Mr. Campbell. Mr. Turbi, do you have an opinion on this?

Mr. Turbi. I can’t help but see your burning desire to get an answer to that question, and I don’t think anybody can give you an answer because that is very subjective.

We do everything very subjective, don’t we?

Mr. Campbell. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Royce. I want to thank all of the witnesses, and I think we have had a very good discussion here today. We do have a 30-year track record to go on. We are all hopeful from what we have seen of late that maybe that track record is going to change.

At the same time, I will say that I have heard a comment about a positive constructive engagement of Libya through Qadhafi’s efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. I would just have to say, based upon my experience and based upon what I have seen in Sierra Leone in terms of the mayhem and tragedy that has occurred there, I don’t see the engagement as having been all that constructive. But perhaps we are at a fork in the road, and maybe the future will bring a different sort of engagement and a different set of responses from the Government of Libya.

I want to thank our witnesses for traveling here, and I want to thank the Committee Members for their patience. Thank you very much.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Opening Statement by Chairman Royce
U.S.-Libya Relations: A New Era?

"Today the Subcommittee on Africa will examine U.S. relations with Libya, and Libya's growing role on the African continent. Over the last several months, the regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, now 30 years in power, has been on a diplomatic offensive. Having turned over two suspects in the Pan Am 103 case, Libya has managed to have the United Nations sanctions against it suspended. Libya also has undertaken numerous diplomatic initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa. It is noteworthy that in September the Organization of African Unity will hold an extraordinary session in Tripoli. Libya had been until recently a long-time OAU non-participant. Libya is clearly moving away from its diplomatic isolation.

"America's rocky relationship with Qaddafi's Libya goes back two decades. In the 1970s, commercial relations between the two countries were considerable, with U.S.-Libya trade totaling more than $4 billion annually. During these years, many Libyan students studied in the United States. This ended when the U.S. broke diplomatic ties with Libya in 1981, due to its sponsorship of international terrorism. Our 1986 bombing of Tripoli in retaliation for Libya's bombing of a Berlin disco, which took the lives of American servicemen, was soon followed by the imposition of comprehensive U.S. travel and trade bans, which have been renewed annually. The bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie led to U.N. sanctions being imposed on Libya in 1992.

"The recent suspension of U.N. sanctions on Libya, done with U.S. approval, has opened the door for Libya to reestablish international air links, upgrade its oil industry, and develop its infrastructure with the aid of foreign investment. The U.S. recently ended its ban on Libyan commercial purchases of American food and medicine.

"The Subcommittee is looking forward to hearing how the Administration will proceed with Libya policy as the Lockerbie trial progresses. But while Libya's cooperation in this trial will be a good barometer of its future intentions toward the U.S. and other nations, the U.S. has other issues of concern with Libya, including its development of weapons of mass destruction and any current support for terrorism."
“An area of particular concern to this Subcommittee is Libya’s role in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the years, Libya has provided military aid to numerous rebel groups, including the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, which recently managed to terrorize its way into the government. Libya also has emerged as a diplomatic player, injecting itself into the Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Democratic Republic of the Congo conflicts, among others, sometimes in the guise of peacemaker, often times as arms supplier. It is hard to look at Libya’s involvement in these conflicts as a plus. It is also hard not to see Libya’s increasing presence in Africa as a challenge to U.S. diplomacy on the continent. Qadhafi’s intention to have Libya assume a leading role in Africa should be of serious concern.

“It is clear that Libya’s international profile is changing. What is less clear is whether this change is fundamental and an improvement. Libya has the potential to significantly impact U.S. political, economic and security interests. Today’s hearing should shed light on how we should proceed with Libya to advance our national interests.”
Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing on Libya. I think it is probably too early to judge where we are with U.S.-Libya relations but I am cautiously optimistic. At the height of the cold war, Libya rejected the Soviet Union as the leader of the Eastern bloc and the U.S. as leader of the Western bloc, because in their eyes, they were all colonial powers. Libya followed Egypt’s Nasser’s lead and had to rely on the non-aligned movement. However by the mid-1970’s, Libya turned to the Soviet Union for weapons denied by the West and because the Soviets were more supportive of the Arab cause against Israel.

Since that time, Libya has been a country, in my opinion, confused with its place in the international community. Although geographically located on the continent of Africa, Libya is seen predominantly as an Arab nation. However during the last year, in defiance of the UN air embargo, many of Africa’s leaders have traveled to Tripoli. Since the OAU meeting last week and the hand-over of the two Libyans accused of carrying out the bombing of Pan Am in [April], many of the African leaders, including President Issias of Eritrea, Chairman of the Sioum Leone Peace Talks, President Eyvindan [Eybe-lema-le] of Togo, President Mandela, President Museveni and President Taylor, have all stated their desire for Qadafi to become involved, and sometimes mediate, conflicts in the region. In conclusion, let me say that I am anxious to hear the testimony of the witnesses before us today and hope we can shed some light on this newly unfolding relationship between Arab-African nations and the United States.

Thank you once again for calling this hearing.
The Congressional Subcommittee on African Affairs
The House International Relations

Dear Sir/Madam,

Prior to the military coup on September 1, 1969, the United States and Libya had enjoyed cordial relations. However, following the military takeover, relations between the two countries soon deteriorated to the point where all ties were severed. Following the tragedy of Pan Am flight 103, and Gaddafi's refusal to cooperate with investigators, the United Nations imposed trade sanctions and travel restrictions against Libya. Those sanctions were intended to punish Gaddafi's regime. However, like all such sanctions of similar nature, the innocent populations pay the price for the deeds of their dictatorial governments. The many years of sanctions and isolation have left the Libyan people economically paralyzed and emotionally drained.

Gaddafi recently handed the suspects in the Pan Am 103 tragedy to face trial in the Netherlands. Such a development paved the way for the British government to renew its ties with Libya. We, Libyan Americans, concerned for our long-suffering relatives and friends, urge the U.S. administration to conditionally resume its ties with Libya, to ease the pain and suffering of the people of the country. If no demands are placed on Gaddafi, he will interpret the resumption of ties as an explicit recognition of the illegitimacy of his regime, therefore will not liberalize his past policies. The resumption of ties should be linked to Gaddafi's regime addressing the following issues:

1. Release of political prisoners
2. Announcement of a legitimate government with a recognized head of state
3. Respect for human rights
4. Enact a constitution and declare the rule of law
5. Trial of all those involved in murders and atrocities in the past 30 years
6. Rebuild the academic, health, social and economic institutions
7. Return all properties to its rightful owners
8. Declare his respect and adherence to international laws
9. Open Libya's markets for international trade to join the international community

On a final note, I ask that the Subcommittee include Libyan Americans in its deliberations, since they have a unique perspective of both Libyan and American affairs.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Ph.D.
Testimony before the House International Relations
Africa Sub-Committee
Ronald E. Neumann
July 22, 1999

Thank you for inviting me to speak to you on the current status of US Libya policy, an area where patience and our diplomatic initiatives have brought a significant success. It has been some time since hearings have been held on this subject, so I will begin with how we got to where we are. Approximately eighteen months ago, UN sanctions, in place since 1992, were having an impact on Libya. But the symbolic dimensions - the ban on air travel and mandate to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence - were seen as increasingly futile. International support for new pressure on Libya was declining. Sanctions fatigue was setting in. Others in the region and our own allies believed it important for all concerned to try to bring the matter to a close. But Libya was coming no closer to surrendering the suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing.

Against this backdrop, Secretary Albright met with the families of the Pan Am 103 victims in August, 1997. She listened carefully to them and was moved by their pain, and she promised to do something to provide the victims and families with some measure of justice and closure as the 10th anniversary of the tragedy approached.

We began months of discussion with the British and the Dutch. Our goal was to fulfill the UNSC-mandated requirement of an UK or US trial for the two indicted Libyans. We and the British had insisted since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 and the 1991 indictment of Fhima and Megrahi that the suspects could be tried only in a US or an UK court. Colonel Gaddafi had suggested that he would accept a Scottish trial in a third country. We decided to call his bluff. We established a Scottish court applying Scottish law and providing Scottish legal safeguards in the Netherlands. This was no easy feat; it required new legislation to be passed by the Dutch parliament, an Order in Council to be adopted by the British government, an UK-Netherlands agreement, and the strong support of these two allies.

On August 24, of last year, we unveiled our plan and said to Libya: You have repeatedly expressed support for a third country trial venue. As Secretary Albright said, "take it or leave it." We expect you now to surrender the
two suspects for trial before a Scottish court seated in the Netherlands. We and the UK presented our initiative to the UN Security Council, and members endorsed it unanimously. Secretary Albright met again with the Pan Am 103 families on October 26 to explain the initiative. Most of the families supported our efforts, including most of those who had originally been reluctant. Secretary Albright committed that there would be no negotiations and that she would seek tougher sanctions if Libya did not surrender the suspects. We refused to negotiate. There was no secret deal.

Instead, from August to April, we worked through UN Secretary General Annan to provide clarifications - primarily of legal aspects - of our initiative. We assured the Libyans that once surrendered the suspects would be tried fairly and in strict accordance with Scottish law. We provided no guarantee of where the evidence would lead or how the trial would conclude. The trial would be a genuine criminal proceeding - not a political show trial. On April 3, Libya surrendered the suspects - thanks in large part to the efforts of Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, South African President Mandela, Egyptian President Mubarak and UN Secretary General Annan. But our clear determination to see the suspects surrendered for trial in a Scottish court was of critical importance.

Upon surrender of the suspects, UN sanctions were suspended, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1192. I would stress that US unilateral sanctions remain in place. Resolution 1192 also asked that Secretary General Annan report to Council members within ninety days on Libyan compliance with the remaining Security Council requirements. These additional requirements - outlined in three resolutions - demand that Libya: renounce and end all support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions of its officials, cooperate with the trial and pay appropriate compensation. We continue to require that they be fully fulfilled. We met twice in New York - first with the UN Secretary General and the British and then with the Secretary General, the British and the Libyans. We invited the Libyans to attend this meeting in order to make clear to them what the resolutions require, that we are serious about full compliance and that such compliance is not impossible. We also made clear our view that we would not
agree to terminate UN sanctions until compliance had been demonstrated by Libyan actions.

As a practical matter, we won’t be able to assure ourselves that Libya is cooperating fully with the trial until after it is substantially underway.

On June 30, 1999, the Secretary General reported to the Council that Libya had made assurances it would fulfill all the requirements but had not yet done so. The Council responded with a Council Presidential Statement that welcomed the positive signs from Libya but confirmed that Libya had not complied fully, and that sanctions would not be lifted until Libya does so. The Council expressed its gratitude to the Secretary General for his efforts and requested that he follow Libya-related developments and report accordingly. In other words instead of acceding to calls by some for an immediate lifting of sanctions, the world community is now clearly on record as agreeing that additional requirements remain and that they must be fulfilled.

The Council’s unanimous position was heavily influenced by U.S. diplomatic efforts. We were forthright about our intention to veto any resolution that would have tried prematurely to lift sanctions.

However, much of the world has been quick to welcome Libya back into the community of nations. On the political front, a number of nations have reestablished diplomatic relations, and Libya has become much more active in regional organizations. On the economic front, immediately following the suspension of UN sanctions prescribing direct air travel to and from Libya, foreign airlines opened direct routes to Tripoli. Foreign firms have also welcomed Libya’s indications of interest in large infrastructure projects, including in the petroleum sector, and aircraft purchases. We have taken a different route, emphasizing the need for Libya to take positive actions to end its support for terrorism and meet all the requirements of the UNSC resolutions before unilateral or multilateral sanctions can be lifted.

We acknowledge Libya’s recent declarations of its intention to turn over a new page, but, given its history, such statements are not enough. Positive actions are essential if Libya is to be re-integrated into the
international community, beginning with full cooperation in the Pan Am 103 trial, and full compliance with the remaining UNSC requirements. We recognize that Libya has publicly declared its intention to play an active, constructive role in regional conflicts. It will be important to test that this rhetoric is supported by constructive and consistent actions. There are several problem areas, where Libya can demonstrate a changed attitude through helpful, concrete action.

We expect Libya to fulfill all of the UNSC requirements: renounce and end all support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions of its officials, cooperate with the trial and pay appropriate compensation. Only when Libya has complied fully will we be able to consider lifting U.S. sanctions against Libya. Right now, such steps would be premature. At the same time it is important to make clear that we have no hidden agenda. We have set Libya clear, specific benchmarks that it must meet if it is to become a responsible and constructive member of the international community. We have set goals Libya can meet if it has the will to do so.
RONALD E. NEUMANN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Ronald E. Neumann was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on September 29, 1997.


Mr. Neumann has also served in the Office of Southern European Affairs, 1976-1977, as Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1977-1978, and as Jordan desk officer, 1975-1981. He attended the National War College in 1980-1981.

Mr. Neumann was born in Washington, D.C. on September 30, 1944 but grew up in California. He earned a Bachelor's degree and a Master's degree from the University of California at Riverside. His foreign languages are French and Arabic.

Mr. Neumann holds a Superior Honor Award from the Department, the Army Commendation Medal and Bronze Star, and the Combat Infantry Badge. He is married to Margaret Elaine Neumann and has a son and a daughter.

January 1998
Libya and Africa

“I have no time to lose talking with Arabs.... I now talk about Pan-Africanism and African unity.” With this declaration, Mu’ammar Qaddafi apparently proclaimed a new era in Libya’s foreign policy. In recent weeks, the colonel has buttressed this statement by attempting to mediate the conflicts in Congo and the Horn of Africa while hosting a series of African leaders for discussions of issues of common concern. The critical question that must be explored is whether Qaddafi’s African policy will contribute to regional stability? After decades of professing Arabism, is Qaddafi’s African orientation genuine or yet another tactical alienation by the ever-mercenary colonel.

The starting point for addressing these questions must be an examination of Qaddafi’s ideology. While leaders tend to base their international policy on pragmatic calculations, Qaddafi has largely remained committed to an ideological approach to international relations. An examination of the role that Africa has historically played in Libya’s foreign policy will reinforce this claim and demonstrate that in the past Libya’s impact on the continent has been more divisive than constructively. Only after such an evaluation can we have a better understanding of the purpose behind Qaddafi’s most recent foray into Africa.

Qaddafi’s Ideology: During the last three decades, Libya’s international policy has been difficult to comprehend, as it has seemingly lacked logical objectives and a coherent framework. Probably more than any other state, Libya’s foreign policy is drawn from the ideas and experiences of its leader. Qaddafi’s political philosophy has been shaped by Libya’s bitter colonial struggle, leading the colonel to develop a deep suspicion of the West. For Qaddafi, the international order dominated by the United States is iniquitous, and thus Tripoli is not necessarily bound by its rules and conventions.

Despite a bewildering change of tactics and alliances, a careful reading of Qaddafi’s speeches and writings does reveal a continuity of themes. Qaddafi’s political universe has always featured three competing arenas: the Arab realm, the Islamic sphere, and Africa. The colonel hopes, that through greater cohesion, the Afro-Arab bloc could use its collective advantage to emerge as an important player on the international scene. It is Libya’s historic mission as the vanguard revolutionary state to assist the emancipation of this bloc and to reshape its political institutions. In Qaddafi’s conception, the factors that have obstructed this elusive unity have been Western imperialism and the conservative local rulers who have cooperated in sustaining Western influence. Qaddafi’s definition of imperialism is rather expansive, as it encompasses European and American military presence as well as private corporations, foundations, and missionary societies. In order to overcome the power of the West, Qaddafi has systematically attacked Western
Middle East by developing an extensive diplomatic and economic presence in Africa. The Israeli technical aid and modest financial subsidies established an important connection between Israel and the nascent economies of Uganda and Ethiopia. In the meantime, Israel and South Africa developed substantial cooperative relations. The muted African response to the 1967 War reflected the success of Israeli policy of neutralizing Africa from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soon after arriving in power, Qaddafi energetically assaulted Israel’s presence and made Libya’s aid contingent on breaking diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. In the era of oil boom, Libya’s aid exceeded Israel’s offerings, and many African states, particularly those with sizeable Muslim populations (Mali, Niger, Congo, Uganda, Chad) severed their relations with Israel. In the end, twenty African states broke diplomatic relations with Israel, making the 1970s the nadir of Israel’s influence on the continent.

Along with a fixation with Israel, the 1970s also featured the other facets of Qaddafi’s ideology as Libya devoted itself to negation of Western influence and propagation of Islam. Tripoli quickly became an important source of opposition to the conservative African rulers and generously assisted liberation movements seeking to overthrow the white minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and Angola. At a second and complementary level, Libya emerged as a major supporter of Islamic movements and states. The overemphasis on themes of pan-Africanism or Arabism should not detract attention from the fact that Libya has been one of the most determined exporters of Islamism. Although Qaddafi’s ideas on Islam radically contradict mainstream Sunnism, through the establishment of the Association for Propagation of Islam, the Ikhwan Fund, and the Islamic Legions, Libya has assisted Islamist forces for many decades. By the late 1970s, Libya became the most significant Arab state in Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing particularly on the states with significant Muslim populations where it could combine its radical ideology with its anti-Americanism.

By the 1980s, the aggressive nature of Qaddafi’s policy began to cause concern among the African states. Libya’s intervention in Chad and its continuous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states through subsidization of insurgencies caused many countries to sever relations with Tripoli. In the meantime, Libya’s Islamic propaganda exacerbated the internal difficulties of the religiously diverse states and contributed to African disenchantment with Qaddafi.

In addition to its foreign policy, even Libya’s economic assistance became a source of contention. In the past, Libya’s contributions have taken the form of direct financial assistance, oil concessions, and joint venture firms. Although all forms of Libyan aid come with ample strings, the joint ventures are particularly problematic as they reflect Tripoli’s attempt to gain access to the mineral deposits of participant states (Chad, Niger, Rwanda, Mauritania, Central African Republic, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mali). Given that Libya is the majority owner in all such dealings, the investments are a means of enhancing its political objectives and of gaining access to the region’s natural resources. At any rate, by the late 1980s, the decline of the oil prices began to place restraints on Qaddafi’s munificence, limiting an important avenue of Libya’s influence in
The 1990s have been a difficult time for Qadafi’s regime. The revolutionary economic policies and the attempt to create an egalitarian order inflicted substantial structural damages on Libya’s economy which the decline in oil revenues fully crystallized. The economic dislocation began to erode the national standard of living as Libya’s unemployment and inflation rates approached 25% and 40% respectively. In the meantime, the austerity program which led to the freezing of salaries and reduction of public expenditures caused further discontent among the colonel’s restive constituents. On the international level, Libya found itself under a sanctions regime and international ostracism arising from the 1989 Lockerbie affair. The confluence of these factors led Qadafi to embark on yet another tactical shift and focus on rebuilding his base among the non-aligned states, particularly Africa. A more chastened Qadafi departed Chad and intimated to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) his readiness to accept certain rules of conduct. In turn, the OAU was the first regional organization to defy the sanctions, and South African President Nelson Mandela took the lead in resolving the Lockerbie crisis and lifting the debilitating sanctions on Libya.

The post-Lockerbie period has witnessed a continuation of the policies of the 1990s. Qadafi has emerged as one of the leading mediators of African crises. The colonel brokered the accord leading to departure of Chad forces from Congo and an apparent reconciliation between Kinshasa and Kampala. Qadafi has also been instrumental in convincing the many internal factions in Congo to resume discussions with an eye toward some type of reconciliation. In the Horn of Africa, Libya has attempted to craft a settlement ending the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The critical question is whether Qadafi has abandoned his revolutionary radicalism and metamorphosed into a force for peace and stability?

The first explanation for Qadafi’s activism is that, rebuffed in the Arab world, the colonel is seeking an international role through visible mediation efforts and pledges of resuming high levels of aid to African states. This explanation is not entirely accurate, as Qadafi has used his relationship with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to escape his isolation in the Middle East. Libya has close relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian groups that reject the Oslo accords. Even the moderate regime of Jordan and the Gulf sheikhdoms have similarly embarked on a rapprochement with Libya. Thus, the notion that Qadafi is seeking a role in Africa because he is denied a position at the Arab round table is misleading. Although the colonel has recently made comments on the impracticality of pan-Arabism, he is still disinclined to abandon the Arab realm.

Qadafi’s determination to play a prominent role in Africa must be viewed as part of a comprehensive diplomatic initiative that encompasses both the Arab and African realms. The basis of the new diplomacy may still be the Lockerbie imbroglio. Despite Qadafi’s feigned indifference to the trial, the Lockerbie affair looms large in his calculations. It is important to
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Dr. Takeyh speaks Persian and Arabic.
The Future of Libya’s WMD Program

Thank you very much for providing me an opportunity to address the Subcommittee on the subject of Libya’s weapons of mass destruction program. This is a topic that unfortunately has received very little attention in the media and public policy communities, but which I believe deserves close scrutiny because Libya has one of the most ambitious chemical and biological weapons programs in the Third World. Moreover, Libya’s Great Man-Made River Project—a $25 billion project—may have military applications that are tied to its CBW program.

I have been tracking and writing about Libya’s WMD program for the past several years, as an analyst on international security issues. I am presently a consultant to Analytic Services (ANSER), a not-for-profit national security research institute, in Arlington, VA, but am appearing before you in my private capacity. I have published three articles about Libya’s WMD program: in the Nonproliferation Review (Spring/Summer 1997), an op ed article in the Washington Post (January 1998), and Jane’s Intelligence Review (December 1998). I have provided copies of my articles to your staff.

Libya is on the verge of succeeding in developing a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability in the form of chemical and biological weaponry (CBW) and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. The Great Man-Made River Project’s massive network of underground pipes are allegedly connected to CBW facilities, particularly the Tarrhuna chemical weapons facility.

However, Libya’s CBW program has received very little international attention, while much attention has been paid to the large-scale CBW programs of Iran and Iraq, and an alleged terrorist group-affiliated chemical weapons plant in Sudan. In fact, according to published accounts, Iraq has sent several contingents of scientists and technicians to work at Libyan CBW facilities, either to assist in accelerating Tripoli’s CBW program or to evade international inspection of its own CBW facilities. There are also reports of links between the Libyan and Sudanese CBW programs.

As a result of those developments, while Libya is threatening to become a proliferator of CBW, it also is emerging as a facilitator for other rogue states’ CBW programs.
In the area of developing a nuclear weapons capability or long-range ballistic missiles, however, the Libyans have not been as successful in CBW because of post Pan Am 103 international non-proliferation sanctions and a lack of adequate financial or indigenous resources or manpower expertise.

It is particularly significant today to investigate the actual threat potential posed by Libya's CBW program in light of several recent developments that appear to indicate a willingness by Libya to re-enter the international community as a peaceful nation.

On the positive side, Libya recently agreed to hand over two of its intelligence agents to be tried in a Scottish court in the Netherlands for their alleged complicity in the bombing of Pan Am 103, as part of a deal that removed U.N. Security Council sanctions against Tripoli (while the U.S. embargo against Libya remains in place). Second, during the 1990s Libya has ceased its involvement in terrorism.

At the same time, however, there have also been several news reports about impending deals by Libya to acquire a nuclear reactor from Russia and the latest No Dong ballistic missile from North Korea, which would indicate that it has no intention of reducing its efforts to construct an ambitious WMD program.

There is a great need to investigate and assess the extent of the progress made by Libya's CBW program, including the nature of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's motivation in developing a CBW capability. Such an understanding is necessary in order to formulate effective countermeasures and policies.

Motives Behind Libyan CBW

Libya is motivated to develop a CBW capability because the Libyan military lacks capable conventional ground, air or naval forces, and its efforts to obtain an indigenous nuclear capability have thus far been thwarted. The pursuit of CBW therefore is a means of bolstering the country's military capability by developing weapons generally regarded as the "poor man's atomic bomb."

Biological Weapons

The Libyan biological weapons program is reportedly in the early stages of research and development, primarily because the country lacks an adequate scientific and technical base. Nevertheless, it is reported to be on the verge of
developing an indigenous BW capability and "may be able to produce laboratory quantities of biological weapons agents, including an unconfirmed number of toxins and other biological agents, although it has not yet succeeded in placing the biological agents in weapons. According to a U.S. Department of Defense report, because of the "overall limitations" of Libya's BW program, it is "unlikely to transition from laboratory work to production of militarily useful quantities of biological warfare agents until well after" the year 2000.

The 'General Health Laboratories' (codename 'Ibn Hayan'), a medical facility located in the Tripoli area, has reportedly been turned into an extensive BW complex with Iraqi assistance. The equipment for the complex, which is primarily dual-use and standard medical laboratory materials, was purchased from China, India and Serbia.

Libya's Rabta facility, primarily a chemical weapons plant, is believed to contain research facilities for biological agents. It is possible that, like Rabta, the Tarhuna CW plant, might also manufacture biological agents.

Libya has attempted to recruit the services of technicians from other nations for its biological weapons program. In early 1995 U.S. intelligence sources, according to published accounts, claimed that Qaddafi had attempted to recruit South African scientists who worked on Pretoria's former CBW programs.

Chemical Weapons

Libya's chemical weapons program is considered to be its most successful WMD effort. Its CW capabilities are concentrated in the Rabta and Tarhuna plants and include a stockpile of up to 100 tons of chemical agents.

Some 60 to 80 foreign chemical weapons experts, including several from China, Germany and Iraq, are reportedly assisting the Libyan CW program. In 1994, several former South African military officials were implicated in selling CW technology to Libya.

In general, the Libyan CW program is considered to have "very low quality weapon designs with poor fusing and lethality." Nevertheless, Qaddafi appears to be intent on establishing an indigenous offensive CW capability, including "an independent production capability for the weapons."
As with its biological weapons program, Libya’s CW effort is constrained by its dependency on foreign suppliers for precursor chemical and other essential equipment as well as the imposition of international sanctions which have severely curtailed the availability of such support.

Rabta

Libya’s initial chemical weapons facility is located in a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. The Rabta facility came into prominence when it was publicized by the U.S. Government in Fall 1988. In March 1990, the Libyans claimed that a fire had destroyed the plant, although this claim was considered a hoax. Since then operations at the Rabta complex have reportedly been hampered because of its exposure as a chemical weapons facility.

Tarhunah

With the operations at the Rabta complex slowed down, in the early 1990s Qaddafi reportedly resolved to build an entirely new, hardened underground chemical weapons production complex near the town of Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli, to supplant the Rabta plant. The Tarhunah facility is a labyrinth of tunnels carved into the side of a hollowed-out mountain, extending more than six square miles.

As with the Rabta plant, Libya has claimed that Tarhunah is a petrochemical complex or that the facility’s tunnels are part of the Great Man-Made River Project to tunnel water from Libya’s southern aquifers to its coastal cities. Western intelligence sources, however, according to published reports, believe that the underground pipes which connect with Tarhunah, many of which are more than 12 feet in diameter (and based on North Korean design), could be used for the clandestine movement and storage of chemical agents and other military equipment or forces.

Former Central Intelligence Agency director John Deutch has called Tarhunah the world’s largest underground chemical weapons plant. It may either already be operational or is close to being so. Reportedly, it already stores most of Libya’s 100-ton stockpile of poison gas weapons previously produced at Rabta. Once operational, Tarhunah is expected to produce the ingredients for an estimated 2,500 tons of poison agents each year.
Ballistic Missiles

Libya’s efforts to acquire chemical and biological weapons are matched with an ambitious program to acquire, or indigenously develop, long-range ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers.

For the necessary equipment and technology to develop ballistic missiles, Libya has turned to foreign suppliers such as North Korea and China, with Iran at times acting as middleman. While Libya has not yet succeeded in devising effective biological warheads, it has reportedly made progress in developing chemical warheads, although its long-range ballistic missile programs are still in the testing stage.

The two major Libyan ballistic missile programs are reportedly the Al-Fatah ("Conqueror") and Al-Fajer al-Jadid projects. The Al-Fatah project seeks to develop a solid-fuelled missile with a range variously reported at between 500 and 1,000 kilometers and a 500 kilogram warhead, which is considered to be a fairly small payload. The missile is in the testing stage and is not yet operational. The Al-Fajer al-Jadid project, a smaller development effort, seeks to upgrade Libya’s aging and maintenance-plagued Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles, with a current range of 300 kilometers, to deliver chemical warheads.

For the past several years, Libya has been interested in acquiring the North Korean No-dong ballistic missile system, which has a range of 1,300 kilometers, although its efforts have so far been unsuccessful. According to an unconfirmed report, North Korea may have provided Libya with the technology to indigenously develop the No-dong.

Conclusions

As I have stated throughout my presentation, there are a number of areas in Libya’s weapons of mass destruction program that require close international scrutiny. The following issues warrant further investigation and assessment:

1) The strategic motivations driving Libya’s WMD program, and whether it is directed against the U.S., southern Europe, Israel, or against internal elements;